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STRANGELY SILENT:
THE MISSING STRATEGIC DEBATE IN THE 2010 MID-TERM ELECTIONS
Robert H. “Robin” Dorff, Ph.D.
Strategic Studies Institute
As dust settles on the November 2, 2010, elections—and the dust storm leading to
the November 6, 2012, elections begins—there is no dearth of analysis and explanation
of what these mid-term elections meant. Traditional Republican victories combined
with some untraditional Tea Party victories yielded an historic shift in power in the
House of Representatives, and echoed across state legislatures and governorships
throughout the country. Those results suggest that “lower taxes, less government
spending, and smaller government” will prevail in the policymaking that begins in
earnest in January.
However, from the perspective of U.S. national security policy and strategy, what is
most striking is the strange silence. For an election year characterized as intense and
historical in its implications, the virtual absence of campaign discussions concerning the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the role of the U.S. in the world, the overall national
security strategy to fulfill that role, defense spending, and the size and composition of
U.S. military forces to support that strategy is remarkable.
Of course, this absence is not itself without explanation. The dominance of domestic
issues and problems—job losses, unemployment, the economy, health care reform, and
government spending and debt—left little room for national security issues to find a
place on the electoral agendas of candidates and voters alike. With the notable exception of very public debates about the military strategy in Afghanistan, this absence of
strategic deliberation and decisionmaking has characterized most of the post-2008
period. Consequently, this uncharacteristic silence is remarkable despite current domestic problems given past voter discontent with the national security agenda of the Bush
Administration and the Republican congressional majorities that were eliminated in the
2006 and 2008 elections.
The absence of a national security debate is also troublesome for many reasons most
of which stem from some fairly simple facts about the Federal budget.1 For FY 2011, the
Federal budget is $3.83 trillion. Of that total, $2.39 trillion, or 62.4% is mandatory
spending—expenditures on programs that are mandated by law such as Social Security
and Medicare. That leaves only $1.44 trillion, or 37.6%, for discretionary spending—the
budget expenditures negotiated by the President and Congress each year. Interestingly,

security spending—essentially Department of Defense, Department of Homeland
Security, overseas contingency programs, and a few others—accounts for about 60% of
all discretionary spending. Eliminating ALL nonsecurity discretionary spending,
essentially all other Federal programs, would yield a budget savings of about $553
billion, or roughly 43%, of the projected deficit even if revenues remained constant.
While no one is arguing for such draconian and swift steps to reduce the deficit, the
implications are clear. Promises to reduce taxes (i.e., cut revenues) must be accompanied by significant reductions in spending, which cannot be accomplished without
national security or entitlement spending, or both, being on the table. It is highly
unlikely that costs of ongoing operations (military and nonmilitary), especially in
Afghanistan, will be significantly reduced by 2012 or even relatively soon thereafter.
Probably even less likely is that the newly elected members of Congress or incumbents
will target broad entitlement programs like Social Security for the kinds of significant
reductions required. Republicans will be hoping to consolidate and make further gains
in 2012; Democrats will be hoping that the burden of governing will once again prove
the undoing of the party victorious at the polls. The possibility is real that major
adjustments in security spending outside of current operations will be required.
So, precisely what this country needs most—a serious debate about the ends, ways,
and means of our overall national security strategy—is what has been largely, if not
wholly, absent, both in the policymaking process since 2008 and on the campaign trails
in 2010. If we are to avoid a dramatic and uncalculated shift in strategy being forced
upon us by an inability to muster the means to accomplish the desired ends, that debate
must occur. It must include how we are organized and what we need in order to
formulate and execute a strategy to protect and promote our national interests.
That debate must involve our best national security professionals, including our
senior military leaders, for it is almost a given that our military will need to be
reconfigured in fundamental and significant ways to be effective, affordable, and
sustainable in its strategic role. Because of its role in resourcing the strategy, Congress
will, of necessity, be involved; but the realities addressed above will pull its members
and indeed Congress itself in very different and competing directions. Left to its own
devices, Congress will likely choose defense spending for “big ticket items” within
districts and states, and it will not likely base those decisions on strategy-driven
budgeting.
Therefore, the debate and decisionmaking we require must be led by the President
and his administration. Congress, both individually and collectively, continues to
suggest that Americans can have difficult-to-achieve ends with little pain and almost no
sacrifice. Military leaders often prefer not to engage in such debates about overall
strategy, and service-centered perspectives for protecting existing and preferred future
programs frequently overwhelm attempts to conduct genuine strategic-level reviews, as
the most recently concluded Quadrennial Defense Review once again demonstrated. We
need those senior leaders and their best strategists to play a vital and vibrant role in this
process.
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At a time when the hopes for bipartisanship and the desire to leave politics at the
water’s edge seem to be dashed beyond repair, the national security of this country
clearly depends as it always does on presidential leadership. But it also rests squarely
on leadership among our best and brightest senior military leaders, working closely and
creatively with their civilian counterparts not only to craft the strategy that will include
an effective, affordable, and sustainable military for the 21st century, but to help
prepare the American public for supporting it. The strange silence on such matters in
our recent electoral and policy processes makes this shared responsibility even more
necessary and urgent.
ENDNOTE
1. These numbers are obviously very large and, depending on the source one uses, slightly different
figures can be found. However, the arguments made here do not depend on those specific amounts.
Regardless of the numbers used, the overall relationships between mandatory and discretionary spending, and security and nonsecurity spending, remain very much the same. See, for example, useconomy.
about.com/od/usfederalbudget/US_Federal_Budget.htm.
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